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CASE NOTES
Insurance Law—Medical Malpractice Insurance—Cancellation of
Policy to Deter Doctors from Providing Expert Testimony-
L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co. 1 —Plaintiff-dentist sued his pro-
fessional liability insurance company for breach of contract. The plain-
tiff had carried a professional liability insurance policy renewable
yearly with the defendant for over 25 years. In 1965 the insurance
company cancelled the policy after the plaintiff testified pursuant to a
subpoena on behalf of a plaintiff in a malpractice case against another
dentist who also had been insured by the defendant. In his complaint
the plaintiff alleged that his insurance had been cancelled to punish
him for having testified, to deter him from testifying should the case
come up for retrial, and to dissuade other doctors insured by the de-
fendant from testifying in malpractice cases. The District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio sustained a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.= The court, al-
though readily acknowledging that cancellation to deter or punish a
witness' testimony would "constitute a corruption of the judicial pro-
cess . . . ,'" refused to hold that such a cancellation would be invalid.
Rather, the court reasoned that "under Ohio law, a cancellation clause
giving the insured an unconditional right to cancel is valid, regardless
of the motive or reason for cancellation."
In overruling the lower court's dismissal, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit HELD: utilization of a contractual right of cancel-
lation to intimidate a witness in a lawsuit contravenes public policy and
constitutes a breach of contract. The court emphasized that although
an insurance contract is voluntary and is subject to the conditions im-
posed upon it by the parties, if it conflicts with public policy, the con-
tract is illegal and void.5
 The court looked to the Supreme Court of
Ohio to determine the public policy of the state, and concluded that
the test of whether an insurance contract is void as against
public policy under Ohio law is whether "it is injurious to the
public or contravenes some established interest of society.'"
In defining public policy, the court reasoned that the state constitution,
applicable statutes and court decisions must be examined.
In L'Orange, the court did not have to speculate concerning the
1 394 F.2d 57.(6th Cir. 1968).
2 L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., Civil No. C-65-549 (N.D. Ohio April 15,
1967).
8 394 F.2d at 60.
4 Id.
5 394 F.2d at 59-60.
a Id. at 60. The court relied on Porter v. Trustees of Cincinnati So. Ry., 96 Ohio S.
29, 33-34, 117 N.E. 20, 21 (1917), and Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Kinney, 95
Ohio St. 64, 68, 115 N.E. 505, 507 (1916).
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public interests of Ohio relative to the intimidation of a witness in a
malpractice case. The policy of that state had been clearly articulated
both by the courts and the legislature. In Sullivan v. Wilkor a con-
tract under which a material witness to a case agreed not to assist
a party in the preparation of his case was held to be against public
policy and void. The contract was held to be an "agreement on the
part of the . . . [witness] to obstruct, impede, and interfere with the
administration of public justice."' In the same sense, the Ohio Penal
Code prohibits the intimidation of a witness:
No person . . . shall . . . by threats . . . attempt to in-
fluence, intimidate, or impede . . . [a] witness . . . in the
discharge of his duty . ..."
These statements of public policy induced the court to hold that the
cancellation of the plaintiff's insurance for the reasons alleged in the
complaint was injurious to the public good and thus violative of the
interests of society. The court reasoned that cancellation tends to
stifle malpractice litigation with the result that a "plaintiff who has
been wronged by another member of the [medical] profession" will
be unable to find protection in the courts." Thus it was held that
cancellation constituted a breach of contract.
In order to establish liability in a medical malpractice action, a
plaintiff has traditionally been required to prove that the defendant-
doctor did not possess the ordinary training and skill possessed by
physicians and surgeons of good standing in the same or similar com-
munities.' 1 Adopting the rationale that the scientific nature of the
issues involved in a malpractice case renders an ordinary jury inca-
pable of determining a proper standard of care, the courts have usually
required expert testimony by doctors to establish negligence. 12 Be-
cause of this requirement, if the plaintiff is unable to secure expert
testimony, the standard of care will not be established, and a non-suit
will result. 13
Judicial and statutory innovations regarding the appearance of
expert witnesses in malpractice cases have not effectively aided plain-
tiffs. Most jurisdictions require a treating physician to testify in behalf
of a patient in a legal proceeding concerned with the disease or injury
for which the treatment was rendered.' In addition, the "adverse wit-
7 63 Ohio App. 269, 26 N.E.2d 460 (1939).
8 Id. at 273, 26 N.E.2d at 462.
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.07 (1964).
18 394 F.2d at 62.
11 See, e.g., Loudon v. Scott, 58 Mont, 645, 194 P. 188 (1920); Sim v. Weeks, 7 Cal.
App. 2d 28, 45 P.2d 350 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935).
12 See, e.g., Adkins v. Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 335, 14 N.E.2d 727, 729 (1938).
13 Note, Overcoming the "Conspiracy of Silence": Statutory and Common-Law In-
novations, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 1019 (1961).
14 See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 799 (N.D. Ohio
1965) ; Alexander v. Knight, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 649, 655 (Phila. C.P. 1961), aff'd mem.,
197 Pa. Super. 79, 117 A.2d 142 (1962).
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ness rule" is generally construed to allow the plaintiff to utilize the
defendant-doctor as an expert witness to testify as to the proper
standard of care." This practice is utilized if no other expert testimony
as to the standard of care is available. The problem with this tactic
is, of course, that the defendant-doctor would present the standard
with which he complied as the proper standard of care. Although a
non-treating physician can generally be subpoenaed to appear as an
expert witness," most attorneys agree that unless the witness volun-
tarily consents to testify, it is best not to force the giving of testimony
because the risk of damaging testimony is too great.'
An attorney has noted an example of this problem in a malprac-
tice suit where the plaintiff alleged excessive use of anesthesia in the
delivery of her baby. The plaintiff's witness, the author of one of the
definitive works on obstetrics which clearly supported the plaintiff's
position, "blandly told the jury he was rewriting this part of the book
[the part dealing with anesthesia] which had been published only
two years earlier."'
Many commentators have stated that doctor-witnesses can readily
alter their position on a given issue to support a particular side in an
adversary proceeding." Thus, the use of an expert witness unsym-
pathetic to the plaintiff's cause and involuntarily ordered to testify
would generally be detrimental to the plaintiff's case. It is understand-
able, then, that plaintiffs seldom resort to the subpoena power of the
courts to assist in obtaining expert testimony.
In its Canons of Ethics, the American Medical Association states
that a "physician should expose, without fear or favor, incompetent
or corrupt, dishonest or unethical conduct on the part of members
of the profession . . . ."2° Despite this mandate, most doctors are re-
luctant to testify against fellow practitioners in medical malpractice
actions, a fact which has been recognized by judges," legislators"
15 See generally Spence, The Adverse Witness Rule: A Cure for a Conspiracy, 23
Miami L. Rev. 1 (1968).
18 See L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1968).
17 Zashin, The Physician as a Witness, 16 Clev.-Mar. L. Rev. 494, 496 (1967).
18 Kelner, The Conspiracy of Silence, Trial, Feb.-Mar., 1970, at 20.
18 See, e.g., Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment,
1 Vill. L. Rev. 250 (1956). The author notes:
I've seen, not once but many times, heads of national medical societies . . . [arid] .
chairmen of hospital boards grit their teeth, . . . [and] distastefully spit out
their rehearsed piece of perjury and embarrassedly bolt from the courtroom.
Id. at 254.
20 American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics ch. III, art. I, § 4,
reprinted in 167 A.M.A.J. 20 (spec. ed. 1958).
21 See, e.g., Steiginga v. Thron, 30 N.J. Super. 423, 425-26, 105 A.2d 10, 11 (App.
Div. 1954), where the court described the failure of doctors to testify as
a shocking unethical reluctance on the part of the medical profession to accept
its obligations to society and its profession in an action for malpractice. . . . A
charge of malpractice is a serious and emburdening charge upon a professional
man, but it is not answered by an attempt to throttle justice.
22 See, e.g., Mass. Gen, Laws Ann. ch. 233, § 79C (Supp. 1970), which allows the
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plaintiffs' attorneys, 23 and has been the subject of much law review
discussion.
This reluctance may result from the fact that doctors often feel
that a jury is ill-equipped to comprehend and fairly judge complex
medical issues, and that in fact in many cases defendants are found
negligent when no negligence occurs." Doctors may also feel that the
rigors of cross-examination and the adversary system of the courts will
expose them to inferences of incompetence." In addition, they possess
a high degree of sympathy for a colleague confronted with a malprac-
tice action." This sympathy, combined with the apprehension that
someday they might find themselves in a similar situation, also dis-
courages doctors from testifying in malpractice cases. 27
Although these reasons make it difficult to obtain witnesses, in
many situations doctors also have been discouraged from giving expert
testimony against other doctors, both by medical associations and pro-
fessional liability insurance companies. While a doctor's natural aver-
sion to testifying is understandable, deliberate coercion to prevent
testimony must be considered both unethical and undesirable.
Of the many reasons which are offered for the inability of plain-
tiffs in malpractice cases to secure expert testimony, it has been sug-
gested that the most persuasive has been the threat of insurance
cancellation. Doctors consider coverage a necessity, and its cancella-
tion would severely restrict their willingness to practice." One noted
malpractice attorney has observed that
the real villain . . . is not the law, anymore than it is the in-
dividual doctor. The "real conspirators are the insurance com-
panies. Insurance companies wield the whip that keeps the
medical men silent and in line. 29
As early as 1938, the Committee on Improvements in the Law of
Evidence noted the role of the insurance companies in keeping expert
witnesses from testifying:
[T]he plaintiff is seriously handicapped in obtaining compe-
tent testimony from other practitioners. . . . More than
that, we are informed that in certain forms of contract of
insurance, obtainable by a medical practitioner to cover his
liability for malpractice, a clause appears avoiding the con-
use of medical treatises in malpractice cases without corroborative testimony by their
authors.
23 See Belli, supra note 19.
24 See Note, supra note 13, at 1020.
25 Note, Malpractice and Medical Testimony, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 333, 336-37 (1963).
28 Belli, supra note 19, at 255.
27
 Comment, Torts—Malpractice—Medicolegal Relations—Expert Testimony, 2 VilI.
L. Rev. 95, 102 (1956).
28 See Note, supra note 25, at 337.
28 Belli, supra note 19, at 253.
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tract if the insured takes the stand against another practi-
tioner."
While no evidence exists to substantiate the existence of such a clause
in recent malpractice insurance contracts," this absence has not pre-
vented insurance companies from making and carrying out a threat
to cancel a testifying doctor's policy.
It has been generally held that an insurance policy is a voluntary
contract, and that the parties thereto may arrange for any method of
cancellation they desire.' As a result, most courts have held that
policy provisions which allow cancellation by either party are en-
forceable, provided the terms for such cancellation have been met."
Many cases outside the field of medicine have held that the motive
behind the exercise of the right of cancellation is irrelevant." Thus,
almost all insurance companies include clauses in their physician's
professional liability policies which allow cancellation after only ten
days notice on the part of the company. 85
The possibility of cancellation is increased by the activities of
many medical associations. Some medical associations may "threaten
expulsion from the society, which may cause ineligibility for admission
to the local hospital staff, difficulty in obtaining bed space, higher in-
surance rates, and loss of other advantages of membership."3° These
associations, whose concerted action could and should protect the
physician, often act in concert with the insurance companies. In fact,
a medical association may threaten to report the doctor's intent to
so Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence (1938), re-
printed in A. Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 558, 579 (1949).
Si Polsky, The Malpractice Dilemma: A Cure for Frustration, 30 Temp. L.Q. 359,
361 n.6 (1957).
82 See J. Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5011, at 596-99 (1962), and cases
cited therein.
88 See, e.g., Riddick v. State Capital Ins. Co., 271 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1959). See also
J. Appleman, supra note 32, at 598-99.
84 See, e.g., Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Strange, 226 Ala. 98, 100, 145 So. 425, 426
(1932).
85
 Hirsh, Insuring Against Medical Profession Liability, 12 Vand. L. Rev. 667, 669
(1959):
[T]he insured [doctor) may cancel the policy at any time whereas ten days
written notice of intent to cancel is required on the part of the company. Some
policies require thirty days notice of cancellation on the part of the company
and a few group policies may be cancelled only at the end of the policy year.
86 Note, supra note 25, at 337; see Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d
118 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959). See also Kenny v. Superior Ct., 63 Cal. Rptr. 84, 90 (Ct. App.
1967), where the court noted:
We are aware of the possible abuses of the so-called "medical committee" system.
Obviously, it is not in the interests of justice to countenance any attempt by
defendant or his counsel in a malpractice action to "corner" the supply of "top-
drawer" medical experts silencing them as potential plaintiff's witnesses by plac-
ing them on a committee to be consulted by the defense in every claim against
a doctor for malpractice.
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testify to his insurer and thereby cause the threat of or actual can-
cellation."
L'Orange is the only reported American case which addresses
itself to the cancellation of malpractice insurance as a deterrent to
the insured's providing expert testimony. The question remains, how-
ever, whether this decision will provide a viable solution to the un-
conscionable practice of some insurers. In L'Orange the court found
that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach of con-
tract and contemplated a remedy at law. Thus, if the plaintiff on re-
mand is able to prove the allegations of his complaint, he would be
entitled to damages dependent upon the degree of injury sustained as
a result of the breach.
In his complaint the plaintiff alleged that, since professional
liability insurance coverage is highly specialized, "and not readily
obtainable," he experienced delay in securing a replacement policy.'
As a result of this delay, he was forced to practice without insurance
and "his professional reputation in his community" was thereby dam-
aged." Plaintiff further alleged that this "caused him to suffer mental
anguish, anxiety, humiliation, physical pain and suffering." 4° He also
asserted that he was able to secure a replacement policy only at an
increased premium for the same coverage.'
Apart from the increased insurance cost, none of the alleged in-
stances of damage are easily proven. For example, in order for the
plaintiff to establish that he suffered both bodily harm and emotional
distress as a result of the cancellation, the expert testimony of a
physician would be required. This, of course, results in a recurrence of
the problem of securing expert testimony. In addition, damage to the
plaintiff's "professional reputation" is not susceptible of absolute mea-
surement and is speculative at best. Thus, the plaintiff's ability to
recover damages is sharply limited by the difficulty of establishing
the degree of injury.
The decision in L'Orange, however, does eliminate some of the
damages which result from insurance cancellation. If, for example,
the plaintiff had been found liable of malpractice after the wrongful
cancellation, but before the term of the policy had run, he would be
entitled to damages in an amount up to the limit of the policy. Thus,
a doctor whose liability insurance has been cancelled to punish him
or to deter him from testifying need not fear financial ruin or the
necessity of suspending his practice. In essence, he will be able to
proceed as if the cancellation had never occurred. Nevertheless, it
is essential that physicians recognize that the use of cancellation by
37
 Agnew v. Parks, 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 761, 343 P.2d 118, 121 (Dist. Ct. App.
1959).







insurance companies to impede expert testimony does constitute a
breach of contract.
The rationale of L'Orange is based upon fundamental principles
of contract law and should be applicable to other jurisdictions as an
effective means of protecting doctors. It is doubtful, however, that
L'Orange will prove to be effective in inducing doctors to testify in
malpractice actions against other physicians. Although the possibility
of being confronted with a substantial monetary judgment may in
some cases deter insurance companies from threatening cancellation,
the desire to limit expert testimony in malpractice cases will probably
continue to motivate insurers to threaten cancellation. Moreover, it is
highly improbable that a doctor would willingly undergo a cancellation
to testify on behalf of a plaintiff. The very fact that L'Orange is the
only case on point may indicate that doctor-witnesses do accede
to threats of cancellation by their insurers rather than defy the com-
panies and subject themselves to expensive and time consuming litiga-
tion.
Since these problems persist despite L'Orange, the issue arises
as to whether the case provides a basis for a legal or equitable action
by a plaintiff-patient against the insurance company of a potential
doctor-witness. In Agnew v. Parks" this type of direct attack was
undertaken. There, the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy by the Los Angeles
County Medical Association to obstruct the orderly prosecution of a
civil action by threatening doctors, from whom plaintiff had sought
testimony as expert medical witnesses, with expulsion from member-
ship in the association and with cancellation of their public liability
insurance. The court sustained a demurrer to the plaintiff's claim on
the theory that since a doctor is under no obligation to testify as an
expert witness, and since his refusal in itself would not be tortious,
the attempt of the association to persuade him to act in a perfectly
legal manner could in no way be actionable."
The decision in Agnew has been severely criticized and should
not be considered conclusive in denying relief to this class of plain-
tiffs:" In fact, it has been argued that preventing witnesses from testi-
fying in malpractice actions constitutes an actionable tort for un-
justifiable interference with prospective advantage. 45
The tort of interference with prospective advantage generally
involves inter ferring with future contract relations, particularly the
hiring of employees and the possibility of attracting customers." In
these situations, courts rely on a wide background of business experi-
ence and records for determining relatively accurate estimates of
damages flowing from the interference. Once removed from the busi-
42 172 Cal. App. 2d 756, 343 P.2d 118 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
48 Id. at 764-65, 343 P.2d at 123.
44 See Note, supra note 25, at 341.
48 See 58 Mich. L. Rev. 802 (1960).
48 See W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 124, at 974-75 (3d ed. 1964).
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ness world, however, "courts have been disturbed by a feeling that
they were embarking on uncharted seas, and recovery has been de-
nied.' This refusal stems from the courts' inability to determine
with a high degree of accuracy the advantage claimed to have been
lost by the plaintiff. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a plaintiff in a
malpractice case would be successful bringing an action for inter-
ference with prospective advantage against an insurance company
which had dissuaded a doctor from testifying. To award damages the
court would have to assume that the plaintiff would have been success-
ful in the malpractice action if the expert testimony had been available.
Plaintiffs succeed in roughly 50 percent of malpractice cases, although
in some jurisdictions this figure has been as low as ten percent."
Moreover, the amount of recovery, because of such factors as pain
and suffering, and the impairment of bodily functions, is not subject
to accurate estimation. In a majority of jurisdictions therefore, an ag-
grieved plaintiff usually will be unable to utilize the theory of inter-
ference with prospective advantage to obtain damages after cancella-
tion or the threat of cancellation has prohibited the procurement of
expert testimony.
In most jurisdictions, however, the plaintiff may possibly elim-
inate the threat of cancellation as an effective weapon for deterring
testimony by the use of an injunction. As L'Orange has indicated,
the cancellation of an insurance contract to deter the giving of testi-
mony not only constitutes a breach of contract, it is also violative of
the common law and the statutes of those states which specifically
prohibit the intimidation of witnesses. In most jurisdictions, therefore,
any threat of cancellation is illegal if the threat is intended to keep
an insured from testifying. Moreover, if the threats are not enjoined,
the plaintiff would undoubtedly encounter a non-suit, an injury which
cannot subsequently be remedied without a new trial. This irreparable
damage, the illegality of the act to be enjoined, and the absence of
any injury to the insurance company would justify the granting of
injunctive relief. Not only would this serve to eliminate the possibility
of serious injustice to the plaintiff-patient, it would also tend to pre-
vent what has been characterized as the stifling of the malpractice
litigation process."
Obtaining an injunction, however, would be predicated upon the
third-party plaintiff's ability to prove that a threat had been made,
and that it could be reasonably expected to deter the giving of testi-
mony. To secure such evidence, the plaintiff must rely upon the will-
ingness of a doctor to testify, and this may be difficult in light of the
general unwillingness of physicians to defy their insurers in any type
of adversary proceeding. Consequently, injunctive relief may not be
47 Id. at 975.
48 Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: the Patient v. the Physician, Trial, Feb.-Mar.,
1970, at 13.
49 394 F.2d at 62.
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available as an effective means of eliminating or reducing the use of
threats of cancellation to prevent testimony in a malpractice action.
Thus, the decision in L'Orange may be considered significant
only in the sense that it provides relief for a doctor whose malprac-
tice insurance has been cancelled because of his willingness to testify.
The case may also deter an insurance company's unrestrained use of
cancellation, and may be useful in the obtaining of an injunction. It
does not, however, provide a clear and effective means of eliminating
such attempts to suppress evidence on the part of insurance com-
panies.
The scope of this problem and the apparent inability of the courts
to devise adequate solutions indicate the need for either administrative
or legislative action. Although malpractice insurance companies must
have some discretion in cancelling the policies of competent physi-
cians,5° certain basic measures should be adopted to prevent insurance
companies from threatening potential doctor-witnesses. The use of
broad provisions allowing the insurer to cancel at any time during the
term of the policy must be modified. This could be accomplished
either by specifying grounds for cancellation, or by including a pro-
vision stating that cancellation or the threat of cancellation to prevent
the insured doctor from testifying shall be deemed a breach of the
contract on the part of the insurer; liquidated damages for the breach
also should be stipulated. Premiums should be regulated so that the
threat of rate increases will not be substituted for the threat of can-
cellation. A practicing physician should be able to buy adequate
liability insurance at a reasonable rate, and insurance companies are
entitled to reasonable profits, but discriminatory rate increases to pre-
vent testimony should be eliminated.
The increase in malpractice litigation, arising out of the ever-
expanding demand for medical services, and the difficulty experienced
by plaintiffs in securing expert testimony demand thorough investiga-
tion of malpractice insurance practices. The enactment of compre-
hensive regulatory legislation would help to insure the continued
vitality of medical practice and the integrity of the judicial process
in malpractice suits.
EDWARD P. DOHERTY
Municipal Bonds and Tax Levies—Referendum—Application
of the "One Person, One Vote" Principle—Lance v. Board of Educ.1
At a special election called by the Board of Education of Roane
County, West Virginia, more than 51 percent of those voting ap-
proved proposals calling for the issuance of , municipal bonds and
the levy of additional taxes to finance school repairs and other neces-
50 See Sanders, Money Well Spent, Trial, Feb.-Mar., 1970, at 16, where the author
stated: "One insurance executive stated recently that nationally 22 companies have
withdrawn from writing medical malpractice insurance because of excessive losses."
1
 — W. Va. —, 170 S.E.2d 783 (1969).
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